One Health failures could let transboundary diseases trigger next global health and security crisis

The study assesses current One Health governance across major institutions, including the WHO, FAO, WOAH, the EU One Health Task Force and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean. Although these bodies have made progress in promoting coordinated response structures, the authors note that many programs remain aspirational rather than operational. A persistent gap exists between international declarations and the practical mechanisms needed to prevent, detect and control outbreaks.

Fast-moving livestock diseases with zoonotic potential are evolving into global security risks, driven by climate instability, geopolitical tensions and widening gaps in international cooperation, warns a new review published in Pathogens. The evidence suggests that many countries remain unprepared for the next wave of transboundary outbreaks, which now threaten not only human health but also biodiversity, food systems and global stability.

The findings come from “Transboundary Diseases and One Health Approach Implications for Global Health Threats, with Particular Interest in Conservation and Bioterrorism,” assesses how modern society is confronting transboundary diseases and how shortfalls in the One Health approach leave critical vulnerabilities.

The world’s existing response systems are still structured around siloed thinking, even as diseases cross borders faster than governments can act. The review concludes that integrated human–animal–environment strategies are no longer optional but essential, especially as certain pathogens simultaneously endanger people, livestock and wildlife while presenting opportunities for deliberate misuse.

One health ambitions clash with fragmented global preparedness

The study assesses current One Health governance across major institutions, including the WHO, FAO, WOAH, the EU One Health Task Force and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean. Although these bodies have made progress in promoting coordinated response structures, the authors note that many programs remain aspirational rather than operational. A persistent gap exists between international declarations and the practical mechanisms needed to prevent, detect and control outbreaks.

The review highlights the complex reality facing health and veterinary systems under conditions shaped by climate change, global trade and political instability. Highly contagious diseases that move across borders can overwhelm veterinary services, destabilize food chains, drive up prices and disrupt regional economies. The authors underline that this pressure extends beyond immediate health outcomes, affecting national security, environmental preservation and diplomatic cooperation.

Transboundary diseases increasingly reveal the limitations of separate human, animal and environmental health sectors. In many regions, surveillance programs remain fragmented, diagnostic capacity is uneven and emergency-response structures lack the coordination needed for rapid intervention. The authors argue that this fragmentation leaves both wildlife and livestock populations exposed, amplifying the likelihood of pathogen evolution and spread.

The study frames the One Health approach as a pragmatic tool that must be fully implemented rather than simply referenced in policy statements. Without comprehensive coordination, diseases move freely between wild species, domestic animals and human communities. This movement threatens ecological stability, weakens livestock productivity, and increases the risk that zoonotic pathogens will reach people in environments with limited public health surveillance.

Conservation impacts reveal deep vulnerabilities: Foot and mouth disease as a case study

The review primarily focuses on transboundary diseases through the lens of wildlife conservation. To illustrate these threats, the authors examine Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), a highly contagious viral infection known for devastating livestock economies. FMD often spreads across national borders, carried by animal movements, trade, poor biosecurity and wildlife interactions. While frequently perceived as an agricultural threat, the review stresses that FMD has significant conservation and public-health ramifications.

In the case of livestock, FMD destroys productivity, reduces milk output, weakens animal health and imposes significant economic losses on farmers and national economies. The disease’s spread can indirectly fuel malnutrition, particularly among children in low-resource regions where livestock serve as primary protein sources. This indirect human-health effect illustrates the interconnectedness at the heart of the One Health paradigm.

The authors also outline the ecological and conservation consequences of FMD. Outbreaks in wildlife reserves can severely impact endangered species, particularly those already stressed by habitat loss, climate change or illegal trade. The review highlights an outbreak in Oman’s Oryx Sanctuary that caused significant mortality among Arabian oryx and Arabian sand gazelles. These population crashes threaten long-term biodiversity and can permanently alter fragile ecosystems that depend on these species.

By presenting FMD as both an economic and ecological threat, the review demonstrates how transboundary diseases pressure multiple sectors at once. The authors argue that conservation failures act as early warning signs for wider systemic vulnerabilities. Wildlife outbreaks often precede or mirror livestock crises, indicating that fragmented surveillance and poor environmental monitoring allow pathogens to move undetected across species barriers.

This ecological perspective reinforces the review’s message: effective disease control requires a unified, cross-sector response that treats animal health, human health and environmental protection as equally critical components of global resilience.

Transboundary diseases elevated as bioterrorism concerns intensify

The review expands its analysis to include the potential for deliberate misuse of transboundary animal diseases. The authors outline how characteristics such as high infectivity, virulence, environmental stability and limited vaccine availability make certain pathogens attractive tools for bioterrorism or agroterrorism.

The review evaluates legal frameworks that govern biological weapons, pointing to the Geneva Protocol, the Biological Weapons Convention and the EU Animal Health Law as central pillars of current biosecurity governance. While these agreements outline global norms, the authors warn that weak enforcement, inconsistent surveillance capacity and gaps in reporting continue to expose countries to the risk of intentional pathogen release.

The study categorizes high-priority biological threats by referencing CDC and USDA biosafety lists. Highlighted pathogens include:

• Foot and Mouth Disease, due to its potential to destabilize livestock industries and food supplies
• Rinderpest, historically responsible for catastrophic die-offs and alleged in past sabotage scenarios
• African Swine Fever, often linked to geopolitical accusations following outbreaks in major pork-producing nations
• Plague, with a long documented history in biological warfare programs
• Anthrax, central to known bioweapons research and past attacks

Each pathogen is examined not only for historical use but also for factors that could shape future risk, including the potential to engineer antibiotic-resistant strains, create modified environmental-stable variants or develop pathogens tailored to bypass current biosurveillance systems.

Discussions of bioterrorism must remain grounded in evidence, not political narratives. They warn that exaggerated or unfounded accusations can inflame geopolitical tensions, undermine scientific cooperation and reduce the effectiveness of coordinated outbreak response.

Bioterrorism preparedness, as the study asserts, must be fully integrated into One Health systems, ensuring that wildlife surveillance, veterinary diagnostics, human health monitoring and security operations are connected.

A call for operational One Health: Surveillance, legislation and cross-border cooperation

Global systems remain underprepared for the next major transboundary outbreak. The authors call for a transformation of One Health from a conceptual model into a fully operational, on-the-ground framework.

They outline several priorities for future preparedness:

• Strengthened surveillance systems: Countries must build integrated monitoring networks that track pathogens in livestock, wildlife and human populations simultaneously. Modern surveillance must be faster, more uniform and more transparent across borders.
• Harmonized legislation: National laws, veterinary protocols and environmental regulations need alignment to support coordinated responses. Fragmented policies slow down emergency actions and hinder cross-border cooperation.
• Investment in veterinary and ecological capacity: The review stresses that veterinary infrastructure is often the weakest link in outbreak detection. Environmental monitoring receives even less investment, despite its importance in identifying reservoirs and spread pathways.
• Better diagnostic and laboratory systems: Rapid detection of emerging pathogens is essential to prevent global spread. Equipping national labs and establishing regional centers of excellence would help close current capability gaps.
• Evidence-based communication to reduce politicization: Conflating science with political conflict undermines global health readiness. Clear separation between data-driven analysis and political narratives is vital to maintain trust and coordination.