Do Energy Crises Really Accelerate Renewables? Germany, Jordan and Brazil Reveal the Limits of the Theory

Energy crises can reshape electricity systems in ways that extend far beyond immediate supply shortages. Disruptions to imported fuels and climate-related failures in power generation can increase reliance on fossil fuels while creating stronger incentives to invest in renewable energy. Yet whether those pressures translate into lasting decarbonization depends on the policies, markets and infrastructure already supporting the transition.

A study titled "Crisis-Driven Acceleration of Solar and Wind Deployment: A Quasi-Experimental Comparison of Brazil, Germany, and Jordan," published in the journal Energies, examines this relationship across three contrasting electricity systems. Authored by Ahmad Alshwawra, Mohammad Zeyad Ayash and Celma de Oliveira Ribeiro, the research investigates whether energy supply disruptions accelerate solar and wind deployment or merely coincide with renewable expansion already underway.

Analyzing four crisis episodes between 1990 and 2024, the researchers identify faster renewable growth following disruptions in all three countries. However, their findings challenge a straightforward causal interpretation. Energy crises appear capable of reinforcing renewable deployment, but policy incentives, regulatory changes and institutional readiness play decisive roles in determining how electricity systems respond.

Energy Security Shocks Can Reshape Electricity Systems, but Not Always in Greener Directions

Energy insecurity creates competing pressures for governments. Immediate shortages demand reliable electricity, often encouraging greater fossil-fuel generation, while dependence on vulnerable energy sources strengthens incentives to diversify supply. These short-term and long-term responses can move in opposite environmental directions.

The research examines three distinct forms of vulnerability. Germany faced geopolitical disruptions to imported gas, Jordan experienced the collapse of Egyptian gas supplies, and Brazil confronted a severe drought that reduced hydropower availability. Each crisis exposed weaknesses in an established electricity system, although the underlying sources of insecurity differed.

To distinguish crisis-related changes from longer-term trends, the researchers combined interrupted time-series analysis, difference-in-differences comparisons and synthetic control methods. These approaches examined whether electricity generation patterns changed after disruptions and whether comparable countries experienced similar developments.

The analysis drew on electricity-mix data from Our World in Data and Ember, Brazilian national energy statistics and World Bank indicators. It examined renewable electricity shares, changes in carbon intensity and, for Brazil, separate measures of clean-energy diversification and emergency fossil-fuel reliance.

The researchers found a recurring pattern of renewable expansion following supply disruptions. However, the strength of evidence varied substantially, with national trends often providing clearer results than comparisons against alternative country trajectories.

Germany and Jordan Show How Supply Disruptions Can Accelerate Solar and Wind Expansion

Germany's experience demonstrates how energy insecurity can coincide with sustained renewable growth. Following the 2009 disruption of Russian gas transit through Ukraine, the annual increase in renewable electricity share accelerated by approximately 1.19 percentage points, rising from 1.08 percentage points before the crisis to 2.27 afterward.

By 2019, renewable electricity accounted for 40.2% of generation, compared with an estimated 26.1% had the earlier growth trajectory continued. The difference of approximately 14 percentage points indicates a substantial departure from Germany's pre-crisis renewable expansion.

The researchers tested whether the acceleration reflected reduced electricity demand during the global financial crisis rather than a structural change. Excluding the 2009–2010 recessionary period produced a nearly identical result, strengthening confidence that the observed acceleration was not simply a temporary demand effect.

However, Germany's revised Renewable Energy Sources Act entered into force before the gas interruption. Its support mechanisms, alongside falling photovoltaic costs, helped sustain deployment. The statistical evidence therefore cannot separate the crisis from the policy framework already encouraging investment.

Germany's 2022 gas crisis exposed another dimension of the transition. Reduced Russian gas availability prompted increased coal generation, producing an estimated carbon-intensity rise of approximately 49 grams of carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour relative to the modeled baseline.

All three analytical approaches indicated an increase, but their individual estimates were statistically imprecise. The findings suggest a short-term emissions setback associated with emergency energy-security measures, without establishing a precisely measured crisis effect.

Jordan presents a different trajectory. Repeated interruptions to Egyptian gas supplies in 2011 exposed the vulnerability of an electricity system heavily dependent on imported fuels, creating pressure to develop alternative domestic generation capacity.

Following the disruption, Jordan's annual increase in renewable electricity share rose by an estimated 1.90 percentage points. The annual change in carbon intensity also shifted downward by 13.92 grams of carbon dioxide per kilowatt-hour, indicating faster improvement in electricity-generation emissions intensity.

Solar photovoltaics dominated the expansion. From virtually no solar generation through 2014, Jordan reached a solar share of 15.3% by 2022, while wind contributed another 7.8%.

The response required institutional preparation. Jordan's Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Law of 2012 opened opportunities for independent power producers and supported renewable investment, but major projects began operating only around 2015.

The four-year interval illustrates why energy shocks cannot immediately create generating capacity. Legislation, procurement, financing and construction must translate political urgency into operational infrastructure. Subsequent grid constraints and gas-import commitments also limited continued expansion, exposing challenges that emerge when renewable capacity grows rapidly.

Brazil Reveals the Climate Paradox: Drought Can Increase Fossil Generation Before Renewables Expand

Brazil's experience challenges the assumption that renewable-rich electricity systems are automatically protected from energy-security crises. Its heavy reliance on hydropower created vulnerability when the 2021 drought reduced generation availability, forcing greater dependence on thermal electricity.

The fossil-fuel share of electricity increased from 14.6% in 2020 to 20.4% in 2021 before declining to approximately 10% in 2022. The temporary increase reflected emergency generation requirements rather than a sustained shift toward fossil fuels.

At the same time, Brazil's diversification into solar, wind and bioenergy accelerated. The annual growth rate of this combined clean-energy share increased from 1.62 to 3.39 percentage points after the drought, more than doubling its earlier pace.

By 2024, clean diversification reached 32.1%, compared with an estimated 27.0% continuation of the pre-crisis trend. The difference suggests that Brazil expanded non-hydro renewable generation more rapidly following the disruption.

Between 2020 and 2024, Brazil added 52.9 gigawatts of solar and wind capacity. Distributed photovoltaic systems accounted for 31.3 gigawatts, representing 59% of the total, while utility-scale solar contributed 9.3 gigawatts and wind added 12.4 gigawatts.

These figures reveal the importance of decentralized generation. However, Brazil's expansion coincided with changes to distributed-generation regulation in 2022, including transitional arrangements affecting electricity compensation and network charges.

The researchers therefore caution against attributing the acceleration exclusively to drought. Regulatory incentives and existing investment mechanisms also shaped the observed expansion, while international comparisons provided weaker support for a distinct Brazil-specific crisis effect.

Brazil's experience nevertheless exposes an important structural distinction. Emergency fossil generation can temporarily protect electricity supply, while subsequent renewable expansion reduces dependence on the vulnerable source that created the crisis.

Crises Create Pressure, but Institutions Determine Whether Renewable Growth Lasts

The study's central contribution is its distinction between renewable acceleration observed after a crisis and acceleration demonstrably caused by that crisis. Germany, Jordan and Brazil experienced measurable post-disruption changes, but their institutional responses complicate attempts to establish independent causal effects.

Germany's 2009 acceleration coincided with an existing renewable support regime. Jordan's expansion followed legislation opening the electricity sector to independent producers. Brazil's solar growth benefited from distributed-generation incentives operating alongside the drought-related supply shock.

Across these cases, sustained renewable deployment depended on institutional mechanisms capable of converting energy-security concerns into investment. The findings suggest that governments preparing procurement systems, regulatory incentives and grid infrastructure before crises may be better positioned to respond when disruptions occur.

The research also identifies important methodological limitations. Jordan's persistent annual electricity trends required statistical adjustments, while Brazil's post-crisis assessment covered only four years. Comparative estimates were generally not distinguishable from placebo results, and Brazil's unusually low-carbon hydropower system lacked suitable regional comparators for a reliable carbon-intensity assessment.

These constraints limit universal causal conclusions. The findings establish a recurring association between supply disruptions and accelerated renewable growth, supported by varying degrees of statistical evidence, rather than proving that crises independently drive clean-energy transitions.

Further research using monthly electricity observations, plant-level generation data and better-matched comparison countries could clarify how much acceleration results from shocks themselves and how much reflects accompanying policies.

The study also leaves distributional questions unresolved. It does not examine which households and businesses bear the costs of energy disruptions or who benefits most from subsequent renewable investment.

For developing economies facing imported-fuel dependence or climate-sensitive electricity generation, the findings emphasize the importance of planning beyond emergency supply responses. Renewable procurement, grid integration and durable investment rules influence whether temporary disruption produces lasting diversification.