Foreign Fighters and Drone Networks Deepen Sudan’s Civilian Crisis

Foreign suppliers have substantially improved the drone capabilities of the RSF and SAF, allowing both forces to strike cities, infrastructure and civilian areas located far from ground fighting.

Foreign fighters, private recruiters and cross-border supply networks are helping Sudan's warring parties carry out more advanced military operations, leaving civilians exposed to deadly attacks far beyond the traditional front lines, according to a new report from the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan.

The report, 'Fuelling Sudan's Conflict: Weapons, Fighters and External Support Networks', describes a web of foreign personnel, weapons suppliers, logistics companies and training operations supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while foreign-supplied drones have also strengthened the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Investigators warned that outside assistance has expanded the reach and firepower of both sides without bringing greater safety to Sudanese communities.

Foreign Contractors Join a Growing Cross-Border War Network

The Mission documented the deployment of as many as 2,000 former Colombian military contractors who reportedly worked alongside RSF units in Darfur and Kordofan, directly operating combat drones, artillery and other advanced weapons. Their presence shows how Sudan's conflict has developed into a wider international operation involving private entities, recruiters and transport intermediaries spread across several countries.

Investigators found reasonable grounds to believe that networks operating from countries including Colombia and the United Arab Emirates used transit routes through Chad, southeastern Libya and Bosaso in Somalia to move personnel, weapons, training assistance and logistical supplies into Sudan. The findings focus on interconnected private actors and intermediaries rather than treating foreign support as a single shipment or isolated incident.

This assistance was linked to RSF operations around Zamzam displacement camp and the later capture of El-Fasher, where the Mission documented grave human rights abuses, violations of international humanitarian law and conduct displaying hallmarks of genocide.

Drone Warfare Brings Deadly Attacks Far Beyond Front Lines

Foreign suppliers have substantially improved the drone capabilities of the RSF and SAF, allowing both forces to strike cities, infrastructure and civilian areas located far from ground fighting. In Kalogi, South Kordofan, documented RSF drone strikes killed 114 people, including around 60 children. SAF strikes in Ad-Da'ein, East Darfur, killed at least 70 people and destroyed a major hospital.

Repeated RSF drone attacks on El Obeid between July and August 2026 damaged electricity, fuel and other essential infrastructure in a city already facing severe pressure and partial siege. Each strike placed greater strain on water supplies, medical care, transport and civilian movement, turning damage to technical facilities into a daily struggle for families trying to survive.

The Mission found reasonable grounds to believe that several documented attacks represent serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and may amount to war crimes. Deliberately attacking civilians, hospitals, schools, markets, homes or places of refuge is prohibited, regardless of which force launches the weapon.

Responsibility Extends to Recruiters, Suppliers and Financiers

The report argues that accountability cannot end with commanders and fighters present at an attack. Investigations must also examine the people and entities that order, finance, equip, transport or otherwise enable operations connected to international crimes.

Countries linked to these supply routes have legal duties to investigate illicit recruitment and weapons networks operating from or through their territory, prevent prohibited transfers and enforce the UN arms embargo on Darfur. Continued military support where there is a substantial risk of serious abuses raises major concerns under international law, especially when civilian deaths and attacks on protected infrastructure are already extensively documented.

The Mission called for stronger investigations into individuals, private companies, recruiters and logistics intermediaries involved in the conflict, along with firm action to stop military transfers that could contribute to further violations. It also urged the UN Security Council to extend the existing Darfur arms embargo across Sudan, arguing that civilian protection requires action against both the forces carrying out attacks and the international networks helping the war continue.