Shifting Generations: How Market Reforms Changed Social Mobility in China and Russia

The study finds that while China shows higher overall educational and occupational movement due to rapid structural reforms, Russia demonstrates greater long-term intergenerational mobility once these structural effects are removed. Both countries now exhibit occupational mobility levels comparable to the United States.

The Asian Development Bank’s Economics Working Paper No. 807, prepared by researchers from the University of Chicago, the University of California–Los Angeles, and the Asian Development Bank, written by Kristina Butaeva, Lian Chen, Steven N. Durlauf, and Albert F. Park, the study explores how social and economic mobility changed in China and Russia as both countries moved from central planning to market economies. Using national household surveys and Markov chain models, the researchers examined how education and occupation levels shifted between parents and children. Their main finding is that China shows greater overall educational movement, but Russia has higher long-term or “steady-state” mobility once structural changes are taken into account.

Different Roads to Market Economies

Although China and Russia shared socialist roots, their reform paths were very different. Russia’s transition followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and was marked by “shock therapy,” a sudden shift that caused GDP per capita to fall by 60% in the 1990s and led to deep economic turmoil. China began its reforms earlier, in 1978, under the Communist Party’s control, and took a gradual approach that kept the economy stable and growing. Parents in the study were mostly born between 1950 and 1970, a time when the Soviet Union was already industrialized and urban, while China remained largely rural and poor. In the 1960s, 82% of China’s population lived in the countryside, and its per capita income was about one-twentieth that of the USSR. Education levels reflected this gap: Russia had compulsory schooling since 1949, while China introduced it only in 1986.

How the Study Measured Change

The analysis used two national surveys, the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) by Peking University and the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE) by the Higher School of Economics. Together, they covered more than 12,000 parent–child pairs. The authors divided education into four levels (primary, middle, high school, and college or above) and occupations into three (low-, middle-, and high-skilled). Rather than simple income comparisons, the researchers used Markov transition matrices to show the chances that a child would move into a different educational or occupational group from their parents. This approach allowed them to separate overall mobility (total change), structural mobility (change caused by social or economic reforms), and exchange mobility (genuine opportunity-based change). They also introduced steady-state mobility, which shows how mobile a society would remain once the effects of transition have stabilized.

China’s Structural Leap and Russia’s Enduring Fluidity

China’s overall educational mobility was high, about 52–53% of children achieved a different education level than their parents, compared with 45–46% in Russia. However, in China, up to 80% of that movement came from structural factors such as the expansion of compulsory schooling and universities rather than real equality of opportunity. In Russia, where most parents were already well educated, genuine exchange mobility was higher, and long-term steady-state mobility reached 42%, compared with only 19–27% in China. This means that while China’s reforms helped millions access education for the first time, Russia’s system produced more enduring fluidity. Gender differences were also notable: Soviet policies had long promoted women’s education, so Russian mothers were often as educated as fathers, while in China, mothers still lagged behind, though younger generations are narrowing that gap. In terms of persistence, it takes up to ten generations for Chinese families with college education to move down a class, but only two in Russia, showing that China’s education hierarchy is more rigid.

Occupational Mobility and Global Convergence

When the study looked at occupations, both countries showed similar results. Overall occupational mobility was about 57–58% in China and 54–57% in Russia, and steady-state mobility was roughly 50–55% in both, close to levels seen in the United States. In China, upward movement came from people leaving agriculture for industrial and service jobs, while in Russia, it reflected shifts away from heavy industry after the Soviet collapse. Gender differences were visible again: Russian women were more likely to hold white-collar or professional jobs, so their occupational patterns changed less than those of men. In both countries, it takes only one or two generations to move out of any occupational class, showing that labor markets are more flexible than education systems.

A Shared Future of Uneven Opportunity

Compared with the United States, steady-state educational mobility is highest in the U.S. and Russia, and lowest in China. But occupational mobility is similar across all three countries. This suggests that while jobs adjust quickly to economic change, education takes longer to become equal. The study concludes that China’s mobility reflects rapid structural progress rather than lasting opportunity, while Russia’s more painful transition created deeper educational openness. Both nations have now reached a point where occupational mobility resembles that of advanced economies, but real equality of opportunity will depend on future reforms in education and access. In short, China’s rise was driven by structure, Russia’s by shock, but both are still reshaping what it means to move up in a post-planned world.