One Health Moves Beyond Policy Talk Into Real-World Risk Response

Global health systems have spent years embracing the language of "One Health," the idea that human, animal and environmental health are inseparable. The harder challenge has been turning that principle into routine government practice, especially when ministries collect different data, operate under separate mandates and respond to the same threat from different institutional perspectives. A new global implementation report suggests that joint risk assessment may be one of the most practical ways to close that gap.

The report examines the rollout of the Joint Risk Assessment Operational Tool, or JRA OT, developed by FAO, WHO and WOAH as part of the Tripartite Zoonoses Guide. Rather than replacing sector-specific risk assessments, the tool creates a common process through which human-health, animal-health and environmental authorities can identify risk pathways, assess likelihood and impact, document uncertainty and agree on risk-management and communication options.

Published in Pathogens, the paper "Strengthening One Health: Global Applications of the Joint Risk Assessment Operational Tool" was authored by Ong-orn Prasarnphanich, Sithar Dorjee, Rukshanda Ahmad, Richard Brown, Sharon Calvin, Hien Do, Peter Sousa Hoejskov, Gunel Ismayilova, Masaya Kato, Olena Kuriata, Jessica Kayamori Lopes, Heba Mahrous, Lisa Scheuermann, Tieble Traore, Linda Vrbova, Jan Trumble Waddell, Chadia Wannous, Endang Widuri Wulandari, Gyanendra Gongal and Stephane de la Rocque. The authors are affiliated with WHO, the Public Health Agency of Canada, FAO and the World Organisation for Animal Health, among other institutional offices involved in implementation.

From One Health Rhetoric to a Working Government Process

The report shows what One Health looks like when translated into administrative practice. Traditional risk assessments remain essential, but they are usually conducted within individual sectors, while surveillance information is often fragmented across institutions. The fragmentation can weaken understanding of threats that move between animals, people and ecosystems, and can even produce conflicting interventions.

The JRA process attempts to solve that coordination problem structurally rather than rhetorically. It begins by establishing a steering committee, a lead, technical teams and relevant stakeholder groups, followed by "risk framing" to define the hazard, scope and purpose. Teams then identify transmission pathways, formulate assessment questions, evaluate likelihood and impact, record uncertainty and translate the evidence into consensus-based options for management and communication.

Many health emergencies are not primarily failures of scientific knowledge. They are often failures of institutional coordination: veterinary services may know something that public-health agencies do not, environmental authorities may possess relevant evidence that neither sector routinely accesses, and local governments may see changes before central authorities do. The tool's strategic value is therefore less about creating another risk score than about creating a shared decision-making process.

For developing countries, where technical expertise, laboratory capacity and surveillance coverage may be uneven across sectors, a joint process can help authorities prioritize limited resources and identify where missing information most constrains action. However, its usefulness depends on whether countries can keep the mechanism operational after workshops and external technical support end.

A 52-Country Rollout Shows Scale and Uneven Institutional Depth

JRA OT implementation had been reported in 52 countries, covering adaptations for routine use, training-of-trainers exercises and regional, national and subnational workshops. The implementation map on page 3 shows a geographically broad but uneven pattern, with countries at very different stages of adoption rather than a single standardized global model.

The authors report 16 pilot workshops during 2018–2019, followed by 74 JRA workshops between January 2020 and March 2026, including four regional, 45 national and 21 subnational workshops, alongside six training-of-trainers activities. These figures show that the framework has moved beyond experimentation, although workshop numbers alone cannot demonstrate that countries have institutionalized the approach.

The country examples reveal why implementation depth matters more than simple adoption. Indonesia incorporated JRA into national zoonosis and emerging-disease guidance, giving the approach a legal basis, while Tanzania embedded it in its National One Health Strategic Plan 2022–2027. Viet Nam developed a national guideline after applying the methodology to threats including multiple avian influenza strains, rabies, anthrax and Streptococcus suis.

Canada demonstrates that institutionalization does not need to follow a single template. The Public Health Agency of Canada adapted core JRA principles into its One Health risk-assessment framework and has applied the methodology to H5N1 avian influenza, measles and Oropouche without relying on the original workshop format. That flexibility strengthens the case for JRA as a governance architecture rather than a rigid procedural package.

From Rabies to Nipah, the Tool Is Being Tested Against Real Threats

The report also shows the model being applied across very different disease and political contexts. Ukraine used joint assessment in 2023 for tularemia, anthrax, rabies and salmonellosis while factoring in the effects of the ongoing war. Senegal applied the process to COVID-19, while the Philippines used it to assess the risk of Nipah virus introduction following outbreaks in neighboring countries.

Indonesia conducted another JRA in early 2026 following Nipah outbreaks reported in India and Bangladesh, and has used subnational assessments to respond to rising rabies concerns. Viet Nam regularly applies JRAs to priority diseases including avian influenza, rabies and anthrax. These examples suggest that the framework can support both preparedness and response, rather than being confined to one disease category or one phase of an emergency.

Subnational rollout may prove particularly important. Nigeria used a cascade model after a national workshop in 2021, extending training to Kano, Kebbi, Enugu, Rivers and later additional states, while Uzbekistan followed a national workshop with subnational training in 2025. Such models offer a route for moving One Health capacity beyond capital-city institutions and closer to the places where outbreaks are first detected and managed.

For development agencies and multilateral institutions, the implication is significant: investing only in central-level frameworks may leave a major preparedness gap. Sustainable One Health systems require local officials, laboratories, veterinary services and environmental authorities to understand not only how to share information, but when joint assessment should be triggered and who has the authority to act on its conclusions.

The Biggest Bottleneck Is Still Data and the Bigger Test Is Governance

The report identifies fragmented surveillance data as one of the most persistent constraints. Joint risk assessment works only as well as the evidence available to participating sectors, yet data systems for human, animal and environmental health often remain disconnected, incomplete or difficult to share. The authors argue that stronger One Health surveillance is therefore essential to improving both the quality and timeliness of joint assessments.

The relationship runs in both directions. Surveillance generates the information required for risk assessment, while the JRA process exposes missing evidence and can guide surveillance priorities, data-sharing and system design. That feedback loop makes joint risk assessment potentially valuable as a diagnostic tool for the health system itself, not merely as a mechanism for evaluating pathogens.

It creates an obvious role for digital transformation, including interoperable surveillance platforms and more timely cross-sector information exchange, but technology should not be mistaken for the solution by itself: countries still need legal mandates, trusted institutional relationships, clear ownership of data, leadership commitment and resources for sustained implementation. The study's experience suggests that coordination mechanisms already in place, as in Nigeria and Thailand, can make joint assessment easier to sustain.

The paper also has important limitations. It is a global implementation report, not a controlled evaluation of effectiveness, so it does not establish whether countries using the JRA OT detect outbreaks sooner, reduce disease burden or respond better than comparable countries without it. Its evidence is strongest on adoption, adaptation and institutional lessons; the next research frontier should therefore measure outcomes such as response speed, surveillance completeness, implementation of recommendations and durability after external support declines.

The success of One Health should not ultimately be judged by how many countries hold workshops or adopt frameworks, but by whether joint analysis changes decisions during real health threats. Future evaluations should examine which institutional models survive budget cycles, political turnover and emergencies, and whether local implementation produces measurable gains in preparedness.