Video recording of ruckus in Kerala Assembly not a 'proceeding protected from legal proceedings': SC

Video recording of the Kerala Assembly ruckus in 2015 was not a “proceeding” that would be protected from legal proceedings under Article 194(2), the Supreme Court held on Wednesday.

The drafters of the Constitution did not intend to interpret 'freedom of speech' to include criminal acts under a ''veil of protest'', the apex court said.

Acts of destruction of public property are not privileged under the first limb of the Article, it added.

According to Article 194(2), no legal proceedings can be initiated against any member in respect of the publication, by or under the authority of the House, of any report, paper, votes or proceedings.

''Acts of vandalism cannot be said to be manifestations of the freedom of speech and be termed as “proceedings” of the Assembly. It was not the intention of the drafters of the Constitution to extend the interpretation of 'freedom of speech' to include criminal acts by placing them under a veil of protest.

''Hence, the Constitution only grants the members the freedom of speech that is necessary for their active participation in meaningful deliberation without any fear of prosecution,'' a bench of Justices D Y Chandrachud and M R Shah said.

The bench further said that the video recording which was procured from the Electronic Control Room of the Assembly is not a copy of the broadcast of the incident in the local or national television but was a part of the internal records of the Assembly.

''Thus, the stored video footage of the incident was not broadcast, or in other words, published, for dissemination to the public. Since it was not a 'publication' of the House, it does not enjoy the protection of immunity under Article 194(2) of the Constitution,'' it added.

The bench said that activities undertaken within the House are classified into two categories - essential functions and non-essential functions.

The essential function of the House is collective deliberation and decision making, the top court said, adding that for an act in the House to be provided immunity from legal proceedings, it must either be an essential function or must affect the exercise of an essential function of the House.

The court made these observations while dismissing Kerala government's plea for withdrawal of a case against six LDF leaders in connection with the ruckus in the state Assembly in 2015.

The Assembly had witnessed unprecedented scenes on March 13, 2015 as LDF members, then in opposition, tried to prevent the then finance minister K M Mani, who was facing allegations in the bar bribery scam, from presenting the state budget.

Besides flinging of the speaker's chair from the podium, electronic equipment like computers, keyboards and mikes on the desk of the presiding officer were also allegedly damaged by the then LDF members, causing a loss of Rs 2.20 lakh.

The top court held that that committing acts of destruction of public property cannot be equated with either freedom of speech in the legislature or with forms of protest legitimately available to the members of the Opposition.

If the act of the respondent-accused is considered as a 'proceeding' on the ground that the alleged destruction of public property held a nexus with the budget speech, then it would mean that if a non-member who is called before the Assembly to depose would also be protected by Article 194(4), if they commit a similar act as that of the respondent-accused, the apex court said.

It added that acts of destruction of public property are not privileged under Article 194(2) and acts of vandalism cannot be said to be manifestations of the freedom of speech and be termed as “proceedings” of the Assembly.

It also refused to accept the submission that prior sanction of the Speaker, as the presiding officer of the House, is necessary to initiate a prosecution against the members of the House for the commission of an offence inside the House.

''When no provisions warranting the sanction of the Speaker-either specific to the offence (such as the PC Act) or specific to the class (such as the Maharashtra Amendment Act, 2015) are enacted, the argument of the appellant stands on fragile grounds.

''For the above-mentioned reasons, the contention that the prosecution against the respondent-accused is vitiated for want of sanction of the Speaker is rejected,'' the bench said.