Does Foreign Investment Build New Wealth? A Study of 155 Economies Reveals the Divide
The study draws on 3,130 country-year observations across 155 economies between 1997 and 2023, using World Bank data alongside other international sources. Its investment measure covers fixed capital formation by both public and private investors, expressed as a share of national output.
A foreign investment announcement can sound like a promise of new factories, better infrastructure and more opportunities for local businesses. Governments compete for these investments through tax incentives, investment agencies and international agreements, expecting money arriving from abroad to expand their economies' productive capacity. The connection between incoming money and new assets is less straightforward than those announcements suggest.
Mohammed Saharti examines that connection in "Does Foreign Direct Investment Build Domestic Capital? Development Stage, Investment Treaties, and the Capital-Formation Effect of FDI in 155 Economies, 1997–2023," published in the journal Economies. His research asks how much foreign direct investment, known as FDI, translates into additional fixed capital, including buildings, machinery and infrastructure. It examines whether a country's development level and investment treaties help explain the differences.
The main estimate links each additional dollar of FDI to roughly 23 cents of extra capital formation over the longer term. Poorer economies show a much stronger connection, approaching a dollar of new capital for every dollar of foreign investment at the lower end of the income range. Upper-middle-income and high-income economies show no clear net increase in the income-group comparisons, challenging the assumption that every foreign investment inflow represents fresh construction or equipment.
What the Money Actually Pays For
Foreign investment can finance a new production facility, purchase an existing company or move money between businesses belonging to the same multinational group. Buying a factory changes its ownership without necessarily adding another building or machine to the economy. Recorded FDI includes reinvested earnings and intercompany lending, making the headline figure an imperfect guide to new productive assets.
The study draws on 3,130 country-year observations across 155 economies between 1997 and 2023, using World Bank data alongside other international sources. Its investment measure covers fixed capital formation by both public and private investors, expressed as a share of national output. Several analytical methods account for past investment, country differences, global shocks, economic growth, credit, inflation and trade openness.
The preferred model produces the 23-cent estimate, with another main method putting the figure at about 33 cents. These estimates fall well short of the dollar-for-dollar benchmark, a pattern the paper describes as consistent with "crowding-out," where foreign investment may replace investment that domestic businesses would have made. Purchases of existing assets and financial transfers can produce the same pattern, so the shortfall does not establish that foreign companies directly displaced local investment.
Why Poorer Economies See a Bigger Capital Boost
At the study's 10th income percentile, the estimated relationship is approximately one dollar of additional capital per dollar of FDI, falling to about 51 cents at the median. Separate comparisons put the estimate at 79 cents for low- and lower-middle-income economies combined, with upper-middle-income and high-income estimates close to zero. No income group or region provides convincing evidence that foreign investment generates more than a dollar of additional capital per dollar received.
Countries with limited financing may use foreign money for projects that would otherwise struggle to get built, including infrastructure, resource extraction and manufacturing facilities. Richer economies have deeper financial markets and more established businesses, creating greater scope for acquisitions, replacement financing and competition over existing opportunities. These are plausible explanations for the income pattern, rather than mechanisms the study can individually prove.
Regional estimates reach about 86 cents in Sub-Saharan Africa, with less precise estimates of 38 cents in East Asia and the Pacific and 22 cents in Latin America and the Caribbean. Europe and Central Asia show almost no measurable connection, and the Middle East and North Africa grouping produces a small, uncertain estimate. Resource-rich economies record around 68 cents against roughly three cents elsewhere, but resource and manufacturing differences lose explanatory strength once income is included.
More Treaties Do Not Guarantee More New Capital
Saharti builds a measure of treaty exposure from 4,125 agreements, tracking which treaties were active for each country in each year. Countries with larger treaty networks initially appear to get less additional foreign investment capital. That relationship fades after accounting for development level, indicating that richer countries' larger treaty networks explain much of the initial pattern.
Separate checks of bilateral investment treaties and broader agreements containing investment provisions produce the same general result. Financial openness, regulatory quality, product-market regulation and restrictions on foreign entry offer no dependable independent explanation after development differences are considered. These findings concern how FDI relates to capital formation, leaving separate questions about attracting investors, protecting investments and improving productivity unanswered.
Removing economies where foreign money frequently passes through raises the average estimate, reaching about 63 cents under a stricter exclusion rule. That estimate is too uncertain to rule out a dollar-for-dollar relationship, and a smaller analysis covering private investment alone carries a similar qualification. The decline in capital formation associated with higher income survives these exclusions, alternative time lags, crisis-year exclusions, shared-shock adjustments and corrections for estimation bias.
What Governments Should Count as Success
For poorer economies, the findings support foreign investment as a potential source of financing for new productive assets. The paper recommends strengthening local suppliers and capabilities so that resource projects create opportunities beyond the extraction site. Its discussion of infrastructure, predictable rules and investment facilitation draws on wider research, since this study does not test which policies attract the most useful projects.
Governments in richer economies have reason to judge investment promotion through new capacity, jobs and technology transfer, alongside headline inflows. Tracking new-project announcements and foreign companies' actual capital spending would give a clearer picture of investment activity. Treaties deserve assessment through legal certainty, dispute exposure and governments' freedom to regulate, without assuming that signing more agreements automatically creates more capital.
The evidence describes relationships rather than proven causes, and some methods designed to isolate cause and effect produce uncertain estimates. National data cannot cleanly distinguish new projects from acquisitions, treaty counts miss differences in legal provisions, and broad industry measures cannot capture every business-level mechanism. Recent semiconductor, data-centre and artificial-intelligence projects largely fall outside the study period, leaving their potential impact on richer economies' results open for future research.
- FIRST PUBLISHED IN:
- Devdiscourse
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