IAEA Project Develops New Tools to Combat Counterfeit Threats in Nuclear Supply Chains

The project aligns with the IAEA’s broader goals of supporting innovation, building resilience, and fostering international cooperation in nuclear security.

 

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has completed a major research project aimed at strengthening the global nuclear supply chain against counterfeit, fraudulent, and suspect items (CFSIs). These items — whether introduced by accident or through malicious intent — represent a significant yet often underestimated risk to nuclear safety and security.

The Coordinated Research Project (CRP), which ran from 2023 to 2024, brought together experts from 11 countries to investigate the vulnerabilities that CFSIs pose and to design practical strategies to mitigate them. The outcome includes new tools, policy recommendations, and a suite of publications that shed light on this complex and growing challenge.

Why Counterfeit Items Threaten Nuclear Security

In highly sensitive sectors such as nuclear energy and nuclear security, the integrity of every component is critical. CFSIs can cause equipment malfunction, system disruptions, safety failures, or even create opportunities for sabotage and espionage.

“The risk from potential vulnerabilities and other failures which can be introduced by the inadvertent or malicious installation of CFSIs is real,” said Itimad Soufi, Head of the Nuclear Security of Materials Outside of Regulatory Control Section at the IAEA. “Our project focused on reducing the likelihood of a nuclear security event caused by counterfeit components entering the supply chain.”

Six Focus Areas of the Project

Researchers examined CFSI risks in depth and worked across six priority areas to strengthen the resilience of the nuclear supply chain:

• Strengthening legal frameworks to ensure compliance and accountability.

• Improving procurement practices to close vulnerabilities during sourcing and purchasing.

• Developing detection technologies to identify counterfeit items more effectively.

• Assessing and managing risk across supply chain operations.

• Promoting international information sharing while addressing confidentiality concerns.

• Examining global impact of counterfeit risks in the context of modern supply chains.

One of the project’s core findings was that confidentiality concerns, litigation fears, and national security restrictions limit the extent of international information sharing on CFSIs, leaving countries vulnerable to repeating the same mistakes.

Lessons from Global Disruptions

The globalization of nuclear supply chains has brought efficiency gains but also expanded exposure to security risks. The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted these vulnerabilities by disrupting international logistics, reducing oversight, and creating opportunities for counterfeit parts to slip undetected into critical systems.

“The project relevance remains strong, particularly as global supply chains face increasing challenges. It provides a foundation for long-term improvements and policy advancements,” said Mirjana Cujic, Senior Research Associate at the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences in Serbia, who studied vulnerabilities in procurement operations.

Research Outcomes and Knowledge Sharing

The CRP produced a rich body of scientific work:

• 17 peer-reviewed publications and conference presentations on the risks and solutions related to CFSIs.

• A handbook by King’s College London, Securing the Nuclear Supply Chain: A Handbook of Case Studies on Counterfeit, Fraudulent and Suspect Items. This handbook consolidates global case studies to provide practical guidance on recognizing and mitigating risks.

The IAEA stressed that this output represents not just academic insight but also actionable recommendations that can help governments, regulators, and industry players strengthen their supply chain resilience.

Building Resilience for the Future

The project aligns with the IAEA’s broader goals of supporting innovation, building resilience, and fostering international cooperation in nuclear security. By developing a shared understanding of the threat and equipping states with tools to address it, the CRP represents a proactive step toward preventing nuclear security incidents caused by counterfeit items.

Future activities will focus on capacity building, training, and raising awareness among nuclear operators, regulators, and supply chain professionals. The IAEA intends to ensure that the insights gained are translated into practical policies and operational safeguards that protect the nuclear sector against emerging risks.

As global supply chains continue to evolve, the project serves as a timely reminder that nuclear security is only as strong as its weakest component — and that even small counterfeit items can have disproportionate consequences if left undetected.