World Trade Is Holding Up Better Than the Global Order Beneath It

Global goods trade continued to strengthen in mid-2026 despite persistent geopolitical tension and trade-policy uncertainty, according to the WTO Goods Trade Barometer released on 9 September. The resilience follows a strong 2025 in which merchandise trade volumes grew 4.6%, but WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala warns that the trading system itself is confronting pressures on a scale unseen since its creation.

Global goods trade entered the middle of 2026 with more momentum than the geopolitical climate would suggest. The WTO Goods Trade Barometer released on 9 September points to continued strengthening even as tariffs, policy uncertainty and conflict complicate the movement of goods across borders.

WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala says the trading system is confronting challenges on a scale unseen since it was established 80 years ago, yet merchandise trade volumes still grew 4.6% in 2025 and services trade expanded 5.3%.

Trade Is Proving More Resilient Than the Politics Around It

Recent trade performance undermines the simplest version of the deglobalisation story. Cross-border commerce has not escaped tariffs, geopolitical rivalry or policy uncertainty, but it has continued to expand despite them, suggesting that commercial integration remains deeper than the political rhetoric surrounding it.

Global goods and services trade reached a record US$34.65 trillion in 2025, up 7% year on year on a balance-of-payments basis. Around 72% of world goods trade continued to move under the WTO's core most-favoured-nation tariff terms, showing how much commerce still depends on the multilateral framework even as governments experiment with more selective trade policies.

The persistence of those flows does not mean trade tensions have become inconsequential. It points instead to a system capable of absorbing considerable policy friction because supply chains, consumer demand and production networks remain internationally connected.

Resilience also has limits. Repeated tariff changes and geopolitical shocks can alter sourcing decisions, investment patterns and market access over time even when headline trade volumes continue rising. Strong aggregate numbers can therefore coexist with significant disruption underneath them.

AI Is Becoming a Trade Driver, Not Just a Technology Story

One of the most striking elements of the recent trade picture is the role of artificial intelligence (AI). Okonjo-Iweala said a surge in demand for AI-related goods helped offset the negative impact of tariff increases and trade-policy uncertainty in 2025, placing the technology boom directly inside the global merchandise trade story.

The implication extends beyond semiconductors or computing equipment. AI investment is generating demand across internationally traded technology supply chains, creating a source of momentum at precisely the moment when other parts of global commerce are facing stronger political constraints.

A technology-led upswing, however, raises questions about concentration. The Director-General's message does not quantify how much of the 4.6% merchandise growth came from AI-related products or how broadly the gains were distributed across economies and sectors. A headline expansion in world trade may therefore conceal uneven participation in one of its fastest-growing segments.

The WTO itself has acknowledged the distributional challenge. Its work on artificial intelligence has examined the potential for the technology to lower trade costs, increase productivity and widen access to markets, while warning that digital divides could prevent those gains from being shared evenly between richer and poorer economies.

Crisis Response Is Becoming as Important as the Crisis Itself

Geopolitical shocks remain capable of disrupting the prices and availability of energy, food and other essential commodities. Okonjo-Iweala points to conflicts including the wars in Ukraine and Iran as part of an environment in which trade is repeatedly being tested by events outside the commercial sphere.

Government reactions can either absorb those shocks or amplify them. During the Strait of Hormuz crisis, countries responded more with trade-facilitating than trade-restrictive measures, including steps to ease trade in oil and gas products, according to the WTO Director-General.

The episode offers a useful contrast with crises in which governments move quickly to restrict exports or protect domestic supply. Keeping trade channels open can allow commodities to move toward markets facing shortages, while widespread restrictions can intensify scarcity and price pressure.

Okonjo-Iweala calls for greater cooperation and information-sharing among governments, international organisations and businesses. Her broader point is institutional: trade resilience depends not only on private supply chains but also on how governments behave when those networks come under stress.

Developing economies have a particular stake in this question. Countries with less fiscal room or fewer alternative suppliers can be more exposed when major trade routes or commodity markets are disrupted, while their capacity to influence international trade rules is often more limited.

Strong Trade Numbers Cannot Substitute for WTO Reform

Commerce remains active, yet several of the rules governing it are struggling to keep pace with digital trade, geopolitical fragmentation and unresolved disputes over how the WTO itself should function.

Reform was a major theme around the WTO's 14th Ministerial Conference in Yaoundé. Members discussed e-commerce, agriculture, investment facilitation, fisheries subsidies, dispute settlement and the concerns of developing and least-developed economies, but a broader reform plan was not formally adopted after it became linked to disagreement over the e-commerce moratorium.

Progress has occurred in narrower areas. Sixty-seven members representing 70% of global trade announced interim arrangements to implement an electronic commerce agreement described by the WTO as a first global baseline for digital trade rules. WTO projections suggest implementation by participating members could increase global trade by as much as US$2.4 trillion by 2040, although the figure remains an estimate rather than an assured outcome.

Dispute settlement remains a more visible weakness. The Appellate Body is still inoperative even as members continue bringing cases to the organisation and negotiations over reform continue. A trading system can function while its enforcement machinery is incomplete, but prolonged institutional gaps increase the risk that rules become harder to apply consistently.

The next test for global trade will therefore involve more than whether the barometer keeps rising. Future performance will depend on whether AI-related demand remains strong, whether governments respond to new crises with facilitation rather than restriction, and whether tariff uncertainty begins to weigh more heavily on investment and supply-chain decisions.

Institutional progress will be equally important. Okonjo-Iweala argues that members should use the current period of disruption to strengthen functioning parts of the WTO, repair weaknesses and fill gaps in areas such as services, digital commerce and green trade.

Global trade has shown that it can continue expanding under considerable pressure. The more consequential question is whether the rules governing that trade can adapt quickly enough to a world in which technology, geopolitics and national economic strategies are changing faster than the institutions designed to manage them.