From Russian Fuel Dependence to Clean Power: CEE’s Race to Rewire Energy Security

Central and Eastern Europe's energy transition is a story of security, infrastructure, and a test of whether countries with different energy legacies can move toward decarbonization without exposing themselves to new vulnerabilities.

A new scenario-based study published in Energies argues that the region's future will not be built on a single clean-energy blueprint, but on differentiated pathways that combine renewables, nuclear power, electrification, storage, interconnections, and supply diversification. Authored by Leszek Zelek of Krakow University of Economics, the study examines 11 Central and Eastern European countries and asks how the region can cut emissions while preserving energy security in a volatile geopolitical landscape.

The region where climate policy became security policy

Central and Eastern Europe's energy politics have been shaped by historical dependence on fossil fuels, exposure to Russian energy supplies, uneven infrastructure, and the high cost of replacing legacy systems. The war in Ukraine sharpened this reality, pushing energy security from the background into the center of European policy debate. The study notes that before February 2022, EU energy debates gave relatively less attention to security and reliability than to emissions reduction and energy costs, but the invasion of Ukraine forced a reassessment.

CEE countries face a double transition. They must decarbonize power, transport, buildings, and industry, while also reducing exposure to imported fossil fuels and strengthening resilience against supply shocks. The study argues that long-term energy security is not in conflict with the energy transition; moving away from fossil-fuel imports can improve national security.

A poorly sequenced transition could create new dependencies and grid stress. A delayed transition could leave countries exposed to fossil-fuel volatility and geopolitical pressure.

Renewables will surge, but they cannot carry the transition alone

According to the study, CEE is moving toward a hybrid energy transition rather than a renewables-only pathway. Under the "Current Plans" scenario, renewable energy sources reach around 45% of the regional energy mix by 2050. Under the "High Ambition" scenario, they rise to 60–80%. Nuclear energy remains an important stabilizing source, reaching roughly 10–20% in the high-ambition pathway, while coal and oil fall sharply.

Renewables rise from 15% in 2021 to about 70% under the APS pathway, while fossil fuels decline from 74% to about 20%. Variable renewables such as wind and solar require backup, storage, interconnections, and flexible demand. The author concludes that renewables alone are not sufficient to ensure system stability, making complementary technologies such as nuclear energy and flexible gas-based generation essential during the transition.

In public debate, energy transition is often reduced to a contest between technologies: renewables versus nuclear, climate ambition versus energy security, speed versus reliability. The study suggests a more practical reading. CEE's transition will depend less on choosing one technology winner and more on building the right system architecture. Renewables can dominate future supply, but reliability will depend on the less visible infrastructure around them: grids, storage, dispatchable capacity, regional interconnections, and demand-side response.

For policymakers, this means climate ambition must be paired with system planning. Scaling wind and solar without grid modernization risks congestion and curtailment. Expanding nuclear without financing clarity risks delay. Relying too long on gas risks locking in fossil infrastructure. The transition will succeed only if these trade-offs are managed together.

Electrification is the hidden stress test

Total energy use and electricity demand move in opposite directions. By 2050, total energy consumption could fall by about 23–35% because of efficiency gains and structural changes in energy use. Yet electricity demand is projected to rise by approximately 56% under current plans and up to 120% under the high-ambition scenario. This divergence is the quiet revolution inside decarbonization. As transport, industry, heating, and buildings electrify, electricity becomes the central carrier of the economy. Even if the region uses less energy overall, power systems will have to serve far more demand, at higher levels of complexity and variability.

CEE countries will need stronger transmission networks, smarter distribution grids, expanded storage, flexible industrial demand, and cross-border electricity trade. The transition will not be won only by building generation capacity. It will be won by preparing the grid to absorb, balance, and deliver clean electricity at scale.

The study also warns that decarbonization and security are complementary but not frictionless. Reducing fossil-fuel dependence lowers import vulnerability and strengthens energy autonomy. But higher renewable penetration increases the need for storage, backup capacity, and grid flexibility. That is the central policy tension: the more ambitious the transition, the more urgent the investment in resilience.

For investors, this creates clear opportunity. Grid modernization, battery storage, pumped hydro, nuclear modernization, interconnectors, demand-side response, electrified industrial systems, and clean heating technologies will become strategic assets. For governments, it creates a sequencing challenge: infrastructure must arrive before electrification overwhelms the system, not after.

One region, three transition futures

The study holds that Central and Eastern Europe cannot be treated as one energy system. The analysis identifies three distinct transition models: renewable-dominated systems, hybrid systems, and nuclear-oriented systems. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Croatia are classified as renewable-dominated; Poland, Romania, and Slovenia as hybrid; and Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria as nuclear-oriented.

The country-level projections show why this matters. Lithuania is projected to reach 75–85% renewables by 2050 with minimal nuclear, while Slovakia and Hungary are projected to rely on nuclear for 45–55% of generation. Poland follows a hybrid route, with 50–60% renewables and 20–30% nuclear. These differences reflect resource availability, existing energy systems, infrastructure lock-in, policy choices, and institutional capacity.

This finding challenges the idea that EU-level climate targets can be translated into uniform national pathways. Shared goals are necessary, but implementation must be country-specific. A Baltic state with strong renewable potential and interconnection needs faces a different policy problem from a nuclear-heavy Central European country or a coal-dependent economy planning both renewables and nuclear expansion.

The study's limitations also matter. Its results are indicative scenario-based estimates rather than precise forecasts. The model relies on scenario assumptions, does not explicitly include cost optimization or price dynamics, and uses aggregated regional data that may obscure country-level variation. Future research will need deeper country-level modeling, financing analysis, cost pathways, technology uncertainty, and political-economy assessment.

Nevertheless, the study's strategic message is relevant. CEE's energy transition is not simply about replacing fossil fuels with clean power. It is about redesigning energy systems under geopolitical pressure, investment constraints, and rising electricity demand. The region's clean-energy future will require ambition, but also realism: renewables at scale, nuclear where viable, storage and grids everywhere, and policies tailored to national realities.